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ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviews de novo the 
rulings of district judges about patent claim construction.  This state of affairs—
surprising to many lawyers who are unfamiliar with patent law—is controversial 
because claim construction is one of the most important and vexing aspects of 
patent litigation, necessary to the vast majority of patent cases, and because it is 
probably responsible, at least in part, for the high reversal rate in patent cases.  
Commentary by both scholars and judges about the standard of review in patent 
cases has centered on whether the Federal Circuit should change it and review 
claim construction rulings with deference. 
This commentary relies on a flawed assumption.  The Federal Circuit 
lacks the authority to review claim construction rulings deferentially, because de
novo review is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments. In particular, the Supreme Court stated that claim construction 
rulings are entitled to stare decisis. 
This article will argue that deference should be granted to the factual 
findings and acquired technical expertise underlying district courts’ claim 
construction rulings in at least some limited cases—but it will also explain why 
change must and should come from the Supreme Court. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: PHILLIPS AND ITS DISSENTS 
On July 12, 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an en banc 
opinion in Phillips v. AWH, a patent infringement lawsuit concerning modular wall panels 
intended for use in constructing prisons.1 At issue—besides a prison panel patent—was nothing 
less than the basic question of how district courts should construe patent claims, and in particular 
the relationship between a patent’s specification and its claims.  In the words of the court, this 
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1 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 
1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir.) (panel opinion), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc). 
2“has been an issue in patent law decisions in this country for nearly two centuries.”2 The Phillips 
en banc opinion will no doubt be a starting point for the practice of claim construction—and thus 
a centerpiece of patent litigation—for the foreseeable future.   
But the Phillips opinion is perhaps more notable for what it did not resolve than what it 
did.  The court had asked the parties and the patent bar to brief a series of seven questions.3
2 415 F.3d at 1312. 
3 The seven questions read as follows: 
 
This court has determined to hear this case en banc in order to resolve issues concerning the 
construction of patent claims raised by the now-vacated panel majority and dissenting opinions. 
The parties are invited to submit additional briefs directed to these issues, with respect particularly 
to the following questions: 
 
1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referencing primarily to 
technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a claim term or by 
looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the specification? If both sources are to be 
consulted, in what order? 
 
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpretation, should the 
specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defined by the dictionaries) only when the 
patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear disclaimer of 
claim scope?  If so, what language in the specification will satisfy those conditions? What use 
should be made of general as opposed to technical dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary 
meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If the dictionary 
provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the 
specification to determine what definition or definitions should apply? 
 
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification, what use should be 
made of dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to 
the scope of the invention disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a single 
embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth are disclosed? 
 
4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority and dissent of the 
now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches, should the two approaches be 
treated as complementary methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a 
patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish the claim coverage it 
seeks? 
 
5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole purpose of avoiding 
invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112? 
 
6. What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of ordinary skill in the art 
play in determining the meaning of the disputed claim terms? 
 
7. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 134 L. Ed. 2d 577, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it appropriate for this court to accord 
any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so, on what aspects, in 
what circumstances, and to what extent? 
 
3Question 7—using the numbering of the Phillips en banc order4—asked what deference the 
Federal Circuit can and should give to claim construction rulings by trial courts. The Phillips 
court simply “decided not to address that issue at this time,”5 but this decision—and thus 
Phillips’ underlying premise that there even can exist a purely legal framework for construing 
patent claims—drew a scathing dissent by Judge Mayer, joined by Judge Newman.6
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments7 and the 
Federal Circuit’s decisions in that case8 and in Cybor v. FAS Technologies,9 claim construction 
has been considered to be a matter of pure law and has accordingly been reviewed de novo on 
appeal by the Federal Circuit, “including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim 
construction.”10 This state of affairs has been controversial.  Judge Mayer, for example, 
described “any attempt to fashion a coherent standard under this regime” as “pointless,”11 
accused the court of “focus[ing] inappropriate power” in itself,12 and further attacked the court 
for “decid[ing] cases according to whatever mode or method results in the outcome we desire.”13 
In dissent from the Phillips en banc order, he had previously written that “[n]early a decade of 
confusion has resulted from the fiction that claim construction is a matter of law, when it is 
obvious that it depends on underlying factual determinations . . . reviewable on appeal for clear 
 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc).  Like the 
Federal Circuit, this paper uses “claim construction” and “claim interpretation” interchangeably.  See 
Markman v. Westview Insts., 52 F.3d 967, 976 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) 
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4 See 376 F.3d at 1383. 
5 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1328. 
6 Id. at 1330–35 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
7 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
9 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
10 Id. at 1456. 
11 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
4error.”14 In Judge Mayer’s view, the Federal Circuit should reconsider its holdings in Markman 
and Cybor, a possibility that the wording of Question 7 appeared deliberately to avoid.15 Several 
of the amicus briefs in Phillips urged a similar position, arguing that underlying factual 
determinations should be reviewed for clear error.16 
As both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have explained, however, there are 
compelling reasons to treat claim construction—at least in the ordinary case—as a matter of pure 
law.  Patent claims delineate the scope of an invention from which the patentee has a government 
grant of the right to exclude others; as such, the public should be able to rely upon a consistent 
construction of patent claims based only upon the documents available in the public record.17 
Other legal instruments are construed by courts as matters of law rather than fact, and it is 
reasonable that patents be treated similarly.18 Finally, at least in principle, treatment as a matter 
of law may promote uniformity in how claims are construed.19 Unlike questions of fact, 
questions of law are generally entitled to stare decisis effect in addition to collateral estoppel.20 
And unlike collateral estoppel, which can bind only the parties to the action in which an issue is 
decided, stare decisis may preclude reconsideration of an issue that is asserted by a party who 
 
14 Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1384 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting from order granting rehearing en banc). 
15 Question 7 asks if, “[c]onsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in” Markman and with Cybor, “it is 
appropriate . . . to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings.”  Id. at 1383.  This 
would seem to preclude any attempt to overrule Cybor, and of course the Federal Circuit is not empowered to 
overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman, although it could overrule its own Markman decision to the 
extent doing so is consistent with binding Supreme Court precedent. 
16 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Connecticut Intellectual Property Law Association Regarding the Issue of Claim 
Construction at 10–11, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 20, 2004), available at 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/CS4555.PDF. 
17 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). 
18 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 387 (1996) (“The construction of written instruments 
is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in 
exegesis.”). 
19 See id. at 390. 
20 See generally Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001).  Note that collateral estoppel may apply to questions of law, but will not apply to questions of law 
litigated anew in “substantially unrelated actions.”  Id. at 1373. 
5has never before litigated the question.21 Thus, if a particular claim construction is entitled to 
stare decisis effect, it will (at least in theory) apply in all future lawsuits in which it is at issue.22 
At the same time, even the Markman and Cybor courts acknowledged that judges, though 
definitionally skilled in the law, are not necessarily skilled in the art to which a patent pertains, 
and that extrinsic evidence—any evidence outside the public record of the patent document and 
its file wrapper, including expert testimony23—may help the court put itself in the position of a 
person of ordinary skill in the art.24 
Phillips was decided without addressing the question at all—correctly, as the claim 
construction at issue did not involve any findings based on extrinsic evidence or expert 
testimony.25 But the question remains as important and challenging as ever. 
In Part II, this paper argues that the Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Markman and Cybor is 
compelling, and that claim construction rulings should ordinarily be considered decisions of law 
and reviewed de novo.  It also argues, however, that the Federal Circuit—despite its undoubted 
technical expertise26—is not and cannot be skilled in every technical field.  Thus, when trial 
judges have heard testimony intended to put them in the position of one skilled in the art, the 
 
21 See id. 
22 See id. Whether a decision that is entitled to stare decisis effect will be binding on future courts to consider the 
same issue, or whether it will merely be persuasive, depends on the courts involved.  See id. (“[S]tare decisis is a 
doctrine that binds courts to follow their own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior tribunal.”); see also 
infra note 123 and accompanying text.  Either way, a claim construction that is entitled to some form of stare decisis 
effect is more likely to be applied uniformly across multiple patent infringement suits than a claim construction that 
is litigated anew by each new defendant.  In particular, if a claim construction is adopted by the Federal Circuit, that 
construction would be binding in district court infringement actions nationwide.  See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 
(noting the uniformity conferred by the exclusive national appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit). 
23 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) 
(“Extrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and 
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”). 
24 See id. at 981 (quoting U.S. Indus. Chems., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 315 U.S. 668, 678 (1942) (“It 
is permissible, and often necessary, to receive expert evidence to ascertain the meaning of a technical or scientific 
term or term of art so that the court may be aided in understanding . . . what [the instruments] actually say.”)); see 
also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
25 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324–28 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
26 See, e.g., Robert D. Wallick & Neil R. Ellis, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: At the 
Leading Edge of High Technology Issues, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 801, 803 (1987) (“[T]he highly technical and complex 
nature of the many patent cases heard by the CAFC demonstrates . . . that the court is a technology-conscious legal 
body highly qualified to hear, assess, and decide technical patent appeals from both judicial and administrative 
6Federal Circuit should grant deference to the decisions the trial judge makes about how particular 
technical claim terms are understood by practitioners of the art.  In essence, it argues that Judge 
Mayer’s dissenting comments in the Phillips en banc order are correct, and that deference should 
be given to underlying trial-court factfinding—but only in the exceptional case where recourse to 
extrinsic testimony is necessary and appropriate. 
This conclusion, however, must be squared with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Markman. Part III of the paper questions whether this sort of deference is within the Federal 
Circuit’s power to grant, and concludes on the basis of Markman that it is not.  In particular, for 
reasons that Part III explores, the Supreme Court’s holding that claim constructions should be 
granted stare decisis effect implies that they cannot be based on factfinding about which the 
Federal Circuit has granted deference to a trial court.  The paper concludes that the Supreme 
Court should clarify or overrule Markman and hold that trial judges may make use of extrinsic 
evidence to help put them in the position of practitioners of ordinary skill in the art; that when 
they do so, their factual rulings are entitled to appellate deference; and that stare decisis is 
appropriate only as to legal matters that do not require particularized technical expertise.  
Notably, as Part IV will argue in conclusion, the Phillips court was right not to tackle these 
questions: Phillips was not an appropriate case in which to decide them.  But another may soon 
arise that is a fitting candidate for consideration by an en banc Federal Circuit and—one hopes—
a grant of certiorari. 
 
II. THE DEFERENCE THAT IS NEEDED 
A. THE PECULIAR POSITION OF PATENTS 
“[A] patent is both a technical and a legal document.”27 Thus did Judge Michel neatly 
 
decisions.”). 
27 Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
7summarize the fundamental difficulty with claim construction, and by extension the fundamental 
difficulty with deciding how claim construction should be conducted and reviewed on appeal.  
Patents are carefully drafted legal documents based on over two hundred years of interpretive 
case law and doctrines that are not always obvious even to non-patent attorneys.  For instance, 
even though the Federal Circuit has repeatedly counseled that claim language is entitled to a 
“heavy presumption in favor of [its] ordinary meaning,”28 this is only true through the lens of 
counterintuitive patent law doctrines such as the doctrine of equivalents (which expands the set 
of infringing embodiments beyond the literal scope of the claims)29 and means-plus-function 
claims (which, contrary to their literal meaning, cover only structures identical or equivalent to 
those that perform a function in the embodiments described by a patent’s specification, not any 
“means for” performing the stated function).30 At the same time, patents are technical 
documents that often require consideration of concepts, conventions, and terms of art from 
abstruse scientific and engineering disciplines.31 Understanding their meaning requires 
consideration of what their terms mean to those of ordinary skill in the art, so expertise in patent 
law is not enough to correctly construe them.32 
This dichotomy is a source of tension in how patent claims are interpreted and in how 
those constructions are reviewed on appeal.  On the one hand, treating patents as legal 
documents suggests that they are best construed by judges skilled in patent law, using only the 
public record associated with each patent: the text of the patent documents themselves and their 
 
28 Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
29 See, e.g., Graver Tank v. Linde, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
30 See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000). 
31 See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1307 (discussing how the term “light spot” refers by convention in the digital 
printing art to the area in which “the intensity exceeds a fixed threshold”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168 n.9 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing a patent on a DNA sequence encoding fibroblast beta-interferon and quoting a party as 
describing one of the relevant technologies as “routine to those skilled in the art”). 
32 See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of 
ordinary skill in the field of the invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.”). 
8prosecution histories.33 This approach counsels in favor of de novo review, as questions of law 
are traditionally reviewed without deference.34 Moreover, because Federal Circuit judges have 
particular expertise in patent law, they are generally better equipped than district court judges to 
correctly apply patent law doctrines.35 The legal approach, broadly speaking, is what the Federal 
Circuit has generally taken. Claim construction is conducted by reference to the intrinsic 
evidence alone—the words of the claims themselves, the rest of the specification, and the 
prosecution history—unless, in light of that evidence, a claim term is still ambiguous.36 And, of 
course, patent claim construction is reviewed entirely de novo.37 
On the other hand, the legal approach ignores, or at least underplays, the reality that many 
patents pertain to technical subjects.  The meaning of a patent is defined by “what one of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.”38 
The Federal Circuit is a court of extremely competent judges, with clerks skilled in a variety of 
technical disciplines,39 but they are not and cannot be “of ordinary skill” in every art.  No one 
can be skilled in every technical discipline he or she encounters, nor even in more than a select 
few—scientific knowledge is too fine-grained and broad-ranging.  From an institutional 
 
33 The prosecution history of a patent forms “part of the public record and shed[s] light on the meaning of the 
claims.”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 872–74 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Nonetheless, 
there is some debate about the extent to which the prosecution history should inform the construction of claims in a 
patent.  See infra note 33.  Indeed, this is one of the questions that the Federal Circuit considered in Phillips. See 
supra note 3.  Consideration of this debate is beyond the scope of this paper; the “legal document” approach to claim 
construction rests only upon an assumption that patents can be construed by reading the intrinsic evidence.  What 
that intrinsic evidence comprises is not important, so long as it is publicly available. 
34 See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991). 
35 See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 17–
18, 28–29 (2001).  As Prof. Moore points out, however, Justice Jackson’s famous phrase, “We are not final because 
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final,” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) 
(Jackson, J., concurring), applies in some respects to the Federal Circuit on matters of patent law.  The Federal 
Circuit is not formally final—the Supreme Court can review its decisions—but in practice the Federal Circuit is 
frequently left to craft patent law doctrines on its own.  See Nicolas Oettinger, In re Independent Service 
Organizations Antitrust Litigation, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323, 334–37 (2001) (arguing that even after taking into 
account the fact that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction largely eliminates circuit splits about issues of 
patent law, the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to let the Federal Circuit make sweeping changes in patent 
law). 
36 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
37 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
38 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
9standpoint, an emphasis on the technical aspects of patents suggests that claim construction 
would ideally be conducted by one skilled in the art—a technical expert of some sort.  Since that 
is not ordinarily practical,40 at least without altering the practice of handling patent infringement 
through suits in courts, judges must take steps, sometimes including taking testimony from 
expert witnesses who are skilled in the art, to put themselves in the position of one skilled in the 
art. District courts give extended consideration to a particular set of technical issues while they 
take testimony—consideration which likely includes factual determinations, if only implicit 
ones, about technical terms and how they are used.  They also make credibility judgments about 
the expert witnesses.  Compared to a district court, the Federal Circuit is not well-equipped to 
review more than whatever textual record is presented to it.  An approach to claim construction 
that put more emphasis on the technical aspect would therefore likely counsel greater appellate 
deference, as it would recognize the importance of credibility judgments as well as the district 
courts’ expertise with factfinding.41 An appellate court that emphasized the technical nature of 
patent documents would likely review claim interpretation only for clear error.42 
B. DE NOVO AS A DEFAULT 
The previous section noted that there are some good reasons to treat patents as legal 
documents whose construction is a matter of law.  It also observed that patents are technical 
documents, and appellate judges who are experts in patent law but not “skilled in the art” are 
suboptimal decisionmakers about technical issues.  How can the legal/technical dichotomy be 
 
39 See Moore, supra note 35, at 18. 
40 To some extent, district courts can put technical decisions in the hands of technical experts by appointing special 
masters.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 53.  If anything, this reinforces the point: it is another way in which district courts are 
better situated than the Federal Circuit to grapple with technical issues. 
41 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he trial judge's major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in 
fulfilling that role comes expertise.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).  This is 
why factual findings by district courts are reviewed for clear error even when they do not involve credibility 
determinations.  Id. at 575. 
42 The precise standard of review is less important than the idea that some deference is due.  I refer throughout this 
article to “clear error” because it is the traditional standard of review for factual determinations made by a trial 
judge.  See id.; see also infra note 82 (listing contexts in which a standard of review other than clear error is applied 
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resolved? 
In some sense, the dichotomy is unresolvable. At least so long as patent infringement 
suits take their current form, decisions will always be made by judges who are not “of ordinary 
skill in the art.”43 Some balance must be struck, however.  The policy considerations underlying 
the existing de novo framework are strong; indeed, in most cases, they are determinative.  As this 
section argues, however, in the exceptional case—where disputed claim terms are used in ways 
idiosyncratic to a particular discipline—the Cybor model of pure de novo review, even of 
underlying questions of fact, becomes inadequate.  Because a trial court has expertise in making 
factual determinations, and because it can make credibility judgments about experts that it hears 
directly, it is better situated to put itself in the position of one skilled in the art, and the 
determinations it makes about what terms mean to those skilled in the art and about which of 
multiple meanings controls ought to be given deference. 
A number of factors militate in favor of granting deference only in the unusual case.  As 
described above,44 the public has an interest in patents being objective documents with a fixed 
meaning discernible (at least to members of the public who are of ordinary skill in the art) by 
reading the document alone.  Although a knowledge of patent law is inevitably required, and the 
intended audience for a patent is persons of ordinary skill in the art,45 this interest is still best 
served any time the claim construction inquiry is limited to intrinsic evidence.46 A trial judge 
 
to factual findings). 
43 Some commentators have suggested changing the existing system, through legislative changes that grant the PTO 
more ability to find facts; through an adminstrative opposition proceeding; and through such proposals as creating 
specialized patent courts at the trial level.  See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Dimensional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003).  The merits of such proposals 
are beyond the scope of this Article; my focus is limited to possible judicial changes to the Cybor and Markman de 
novo review regime. 
44 See supra Section A. 
45 See supra note 32; see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
46 Arguably, considering prosecution history to be “intrinsic evidence” undermines this goal because it is much less 
accessible than the patent document itself, even if it is obtainable and a matter of public record.  For an interesting 
set of arguments that reference to the prosecution history is misplaced in claim construction, see John R. Thomas, 
On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim 
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has no particular advantage over an appellate judge in reviewing this intrinsic evidence, if that is 
as far as a claim construction inquiry goes; all the evidence is in documentary form and is 
directly available.  Moreover, the public interest in knowing the scope of patent claims is also 
furthered by uniformity in how a given patent is construed, which in turn is enhanced by treating 
claim construction as a matter of binding legal precedent rather than a factual issue that must be 
reexamined anew when new parties litigate a patent for the first time.47 For these reasons, the 
Federal Circuit has consistently held that when the meaning of a patent claim is clear from the 
intrinsic evidence, claims should be construed with respect to that intrinsic evidence, and resort 
to extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony is not just unnecessary, but improper.48 An 
extension of this logic supports the conclusion—implicitly recognized by the Phillips court—that 
even if the specification is to be privileged over dictionaries, dictionaries should be privileged 
over other extrinsic evidence, because dictionaries “ha[ve] the value of being an unbiased source 
‘accessible to the public in advance of litigation.’”49 
Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183 (1999). 
 Even so, the availability of the prosecution history as public record is the traditional justification for using it 
to construe patent claims.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 872–74 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).  A sufficiently diligent member of the public could, in principle, consult it before embarking on a potentially-
infringing activity, and it is available for Federal Circuit judges to review as easily as for district judges. 
47 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996) (giving stare decisis effect to issues of 
claim construction); cf. Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 331–33, 349–50 (1971) 
(holding that collateral estoppel may be asserted against a party to the original suit in which an issue is decided, but 
not against others).  The benefit of uniformity also derives from the Federal Circuit’s national jurisdiction.  See id. 
 Section 2 will discuss in greater detail the linkage between stare decisis and de novo review.  In brief, stare 
decisis is premised on the ideas that lower courts cannot bind higher courts, and that decisions about legal issues are 
entitled to precedential effect. See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 
1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  If the decision of a lower court receives deference and is adopted by the Federal 
Circuit without a de novo review, the decision effectively has a precedential effect that outweighs its author’s place 
in the hierarchy of courts.  See infra.
48 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).   
49 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585).  
Compare this statement to Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19, which enumerates the many disadvantages of expert 
testimony. 
 Of course, dictionaries and expert testimony are hardly the only extrinisic evidence possible.  Although the 
Phillips court did not recognize this fact, documentary evidence that is extrinsic to a patent but contemporaneous 
with it would seem likely to avoid many of the disadvantages of expert testimony.  The weight that such evidence 
deserves will no doubt be explored in cases brought by prudent post-Phillips litigants.  But to the extent that the 
application of such evidence requires an essentially factual inquiry into what an ordinary artisan would have 
understood a patent to mean at the time it was written or issued, the use of such other extrinsic evidence should also 
be entitled to deferential review on appeal. 
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Even where the intrinsic evidence does not reveal the meaning of patent claim terms, 
expert technical knowledge is often unnecessary when resolving ambiguities and defining claim 
terms.  The reason for this is simple: the disputed claim terms, even for technical patents, are 
often not terms of art, but rather are ordinary English words given their everyday meanings.50 
When technical meanings are not implicated, there is no reason to treat construction of patent 
documents any differently from the construction of any other objective legal document, such as a 
statute.  In other words, there is no separate technical conception of many disputed claim terms; 
in these cases, the legal conception of the patent document controls. 
This is likely part of what motivated the Federal Circuit’s pre-Phillips holdings that 
“[d]ictionaries are always available to the court to aid in the task of determining meanings that 
would have been attributed by those of skill in the relevant art to any disputed terms used by the 
inventor in the claims.”51 In Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
emphasized the availability of dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises and specifically held that 
they are available at any time to both trial and appellate courts equally, whether or not offered 
into evidence by a party.52 As such, it questioned the appropriateness of labelling such sources 
as “evidence” at all, much less “extrinsic evidence”53—rather, the court treated dictionaries 
almost as it would treat a source of law, like a case, of which a court would always be permitted 
to take judicial notice. 
 
50 See, e.g., International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing, in a case about 
the manufacture of MOSFETs (a type of high-power transistor), the term “adjoining” as used in its ordinary sense of 
“next to”); see also Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles & Rules for Dictionaries at 
the Patent Office and the Courts (unpublished manuscript, Oct. 5, 2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=577262 
(criticizing International Rectifier’s use of dictionaries to construe common English claim terms). 
51 Tex. Digital Sys. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6). 
52 Id. at 1203. 
53 Id. (“As resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in the understanding of technology and 
terminology, it is entirely proper for both trial and appellate judges to consult these materials at any stage of a 
litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or not. Thus, categorizing them as 
‘extrinsic evidence’ or even a ‘special form of extrinsic evidence’ is misplaced and does not inform the analysis.”). 
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In Phillips, the Federal Circuit retreated somewhat from its holding in Texas Digital.54 
Although it did not outright overrule that case, it stated that “the methodology it adopted placed 
too much reliance on extrinsic sources such as dictionaries, treatises, and encyclopedias and too 
little on intrinsic sources, in particular the specification and prosecution history.”55 When 
construing patents, it held, one should place the greatest weight on “how the patentee used the 
claim term in claims, specification, and prosecution history, rather than starting with a broad 
[dictionary] definition and whittling it down.”56 Notably, however, the Phillips court explicitly 
declined to preclude the use of dictionaries or to disavow its holding in Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., that “judges are free to consult dictionaries and technical treatises ‘at any 
time in order to better understand the underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary 
definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict 
any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’”57 
Although both Vitronics and the Texas Digital line of cases have acknowledged the 
utility of both general and technical dictionaries—the dictionaries cited in Texas Digital itself 
were two dictionaries of electronics58—the terms that the court has most often looked to 
dictionaries to define have tended not to be technical ones.  For instance, Texas Digital used 
them to define “display” and “activate,” neither of which had a meaning that diverged from the 
everyday one.59 Appellate judges are just as qualified to read, interpret, and apply ordinary 
English dictionary definitions as trial judges are.  Interpreting English text in light of dictionary 
definitions does not make use of a trial judge’s expertise in factfinding, nor does it require the 
 
54 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (discussing Texas Digital). 
55 Id. at 1320. 
56 Id. at 1321. 
57 Id. at 1322–23 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
58 Texas Digital, 308 F.3d at 1206 (citing MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 20 (6th ed. 1984)), 1209 (citing 
ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 147 (3d ed. 1985)). 
59 Id. 
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consideration of evidence to which the trial judge has had more thorough and direct exposure.60 
As Judge Linn pointed out in Texas Digital, dictionaries have historically been considered to be 
acceptable sources for judges to consult when construing other documents as a matter of law, 
including both statutes and contracts.61 
It is thus an exceptional case in which resort to truly extrinsic evidence—expert 
testimony—is necessary.  This is consonant with the observation of the the Vitronics court that 
intrinsic evidence alone is usually sufficient.62 In these cases, claim construction reduces to a 
matter of law, and de novo review is logical and appropriate. 
As the Federal Circuit has observed, however, expert testimony is sometimes still 
necessary. Claim terms may be ambiguous; it may be unclear which of several definitions apply; 
or claim terms may be used by those skilled in the art—particularly in rapidly evolving fields—
in ways that are poorly reflected by published dictionaries and by the intrinsic evidence.63 
Indeed, the renewed emphasis in Phillips on considering the “ordinary meaning” of a claim term 
to be “its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent” rather than “the meaning 
of the term in the abstract, out of context” renders it, perhaps, more likely that a court will have 
to resort to such evidence than under a pro-dictionary Texas Digital conception of the art of 
claim construction: the court, after all, is not an “ordinary artisan.”64 Faced with the not-
uncommon situation of a patent specification that does not speak to a claim term and a proffered 
 
60 There may be occasions in which use of a dictionary requires the resolution of some predicate factual question, 
such as whether a general dictionary or a technical treatise should control, or which of a number of definitions is 
more likely to be what a person skilled in the art might have meant.  In these cases, there may be a reason to defer to 
trial court factfindings even when the trial court has used a dictionary rather than heard testimony from an expert 
witness.  However, it would not be the interpretation of a dictionary definition that would receive deference; rather, 
it would be the resolution of the predicate question. 
61 Id. at 1203; see, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 355, 125 S. Ct. 1752, 1759 n.1 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (citing three general-purpose dictionaries to define “court” for purposes of statutory interpretation). 
62 See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583 (“In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any 
ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.”). 
63 See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing the necessity of 
extrinsic evidence when claim terms are ambiguous or terms of art). 
64 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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dictionary definition of that term, a court following Texas Digital might simply adopt the 
dictionary definition, but a court following Phillips—and mindful of Phillips’ cautionary notes 
about the importance of context—might need additional extrinsic evidence to determine whether 
a dictionary’s definition is really what an “ordinary artisan” would have meant. 
One example of the difficulty of adopting the viewpoint of an “ordinary artisan” is the 
case of Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co. In Pitney Bowes, the Federal Circuit held that 
the district court had properly taken and considered expert testimony on the way that persons of 
ordinary skill in the art (here, the digital printing art) conventionally measured the size of a spot 
of light.65 Although “size” would seem to be a straightforward and nontechnical term, light spots 
are fuzzy; the size of a spot can be measured in different ways.  Of particular interest was 
whether the size of a spot varied with its intensity.  If a spot was defined by the area in which 
light intensity exceeded a certain percentage of the maximum, then varying the intensity would 
not alter the spot size, whereas if a spot was defined by the area in which light intensity exceeded 
a fixed threshold, varying the intensity would alter the size of the spot.66 The district court took 
expert testimony on this question, and one expert testified that although the percentage-based 
definition of size better accorded with usage in optics and with common English, as a term of art 
in the digital printing field, spot size was usually measured with respect to a fixed light intensity: 
only where the light is strong enough is printer toner deposited.67 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit in Pitney Bowes held that the question of how light spot 
sizes were measured in the art was irrelevant.  On the basis of the written description, it held that 
the disputed use of “spot” did not refer to a light spot at all, but rather to the “discharged area on 
the photoreceptor.”68 However, Pitney Bowes’s spots remain a good example of how expert 
 
65 Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1306–09.  The relevant claim language was “spots of different sizes.”  Id. at 1302. 
66 Id. at 1306–07. 
67 Id. at 1307. 
68 Id. at 1314. 
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testimony might be appropriately used during claim construction, not merely to inform the judge 
about the general state of the art,69 but to give an understanding of how specific terms are used 
and understood by those skilled in the art.  The sizes of spots of light, not just spots of discharged 
photoreceptor material, were referred to in the Pitney Bowes patent—just not in the disputed 
claims—and the interpretation of the term remained relevant to collateral arguments about 
whether the claim construction excluded the preferred embodiment.70 To define the size of a 
light spot, the district court had little choice but to rely on expert testimony and choose among 
conflicting experts with differing views on common usage in the digital printing art.  Thus, 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusory statement in Markman, defining “spot size” as to a 
light spot required a credibility determination that was not “subsumed within the necessarily 
sophisticated analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a 
term can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole.”71 
Inquiring of experts how terms are used in the art is a quintessentially factual inquiry, and 
may involve a credibility judgment that an appellate court is ill-equipped to review from a 
 
69 In an unusual statement of “additional views” on Pitney Bowes, Judge Rader, with Judge Plager concurring, 
discussed the circumstances in which expert testimony is permissible: “The process of claim construction at the trial 
court level will often benefit from expert testimony which may (1) supply a proper technological context to 
understand the claims (words often have meaning only in context), (2) explain the meaning of claim terms as 
understood by one of skill in the art (the ultimate standard for claim meaning . . . ), and (3) help the trial court 
understand the patent process itself (complex prosecution histories—not to mention specifications—are not familiar 
to most trial courts).”  Id. at 1314 (Rader, J., “additional views”).  Only the second of these directly constitutes 
construing the claims, and presumably corresponds to the “rare” situation in Vitronics in which expert testimony is 
permissible to construe claims that are ambiguous based on the intrinsic evidence. 
70 Id. at 1309. 
71 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996).  Indeed, in another recent Federal Circuit 
opinion, the court remanded a case to the district court specifically so that it could take expert testimony to 
determine how one of ordinary skill in the art would construe a claim term: “Unfortunately, on the record before us, 
we are unable to say with certainty whether or not one of skill in the art would understand that a power supply is 
designed to provide a constant voltage to a circuit. Given the complex technology involved in this case, we think 
that this matter can only be resolved by further evidentiary hearings, including expert testimony, before the district 
court.”  NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  As in Pitney Bowes,
the question that required expert testimony was ultimately avoided rather than definitively resolved as a subsidiary 
fact issue.  See NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., Civil Action No. 98-699-KAJ, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8054, at *45–*46 (D. Del. May 9, 2003) (holding that the expert testimony was ultimately unhelpful, and 
that the use of “power supply” in the specification rendered the construction adequately clear), aff’d, 110 Fed. Appx. 
103 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 2004) (unpublished).  Again, however, the potential utility of expert testimony in claim 
construction, and the concomitant need for credibility determinations, is apparent. 
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written record.  Such judgments are ordinarily reviewed with deference, even when made by a 
judge rather than a jury.72 The appellate court, of course, may reverse such findings when indeed 
they appear to be clearly erroneous based on the transcripts available to the appellate court or 
when the trial judge has misapplied the law—such as in cases where, under Vitronics, resorting 
to expert testimony to construe claims is erroneous to begin with. 
Granting clear error deference to subsidiary questions of fact has an additional advantage: 
it solidifies trial rulings upon which the parties have spent considerable judicial resources.  The 
Federal Circuit has been widely criticized for the frequency with which it reverses district court 
claim constructions after an expensive trial.73 Because subsidiary questions of fact would only 
be dispositive in a minority of cases, reviewing them for clear error would probably not 
significantly improve the overall reversal rate.  But it would probably improve the reversal rate 
in cases involving highly technical patents, which are among the most complicated and 
expensive of cases.74 It would also grant deference to those Markman proceedings that are most 
expensive, if one of the various proposals for more interlocutory appeals of claim construction 
were followed and claim constructions were made appealable more often before a full trial.75 
Thus, even if it only applies to a small subset of cases, appellate deference to subsidiary 
questions of fact during claim construction might well provide a nontrivial overall increase in 
judicial efficiency. 
The sort of “mixed inquiry” in which clear error deference is granted to factual findings 
 
72 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 
73 See Moore, supra note 35, at 2–3; Rai, supra note 43, at 1058; see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of 
the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (stating that the 
Federal Circuit’s claim construction reversal rate is forty-four percent); Andrew T. Zidel, Comment, Patent Claim 
Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 711, 746 (finding a reversal rate of 41.5% in patent cases decided after 2001). 
74 See Rai, supra note 43, at 1066 (noting that patent infringement suits are a particularly expensive mechanism for 
mediating disputes about complex technology).  Of course, not all high-technology cases require resolution of 
subsidiary questions of fact, see supra note 50, but this is not necessary for the reversal rate to improve. 
75 See Craig Allen Nard, Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 355, 
378. 
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that form only a small portion of a broader question of law sounds convoluted, but is actually 
quite commonplace.  As Judge Mayer observed in his opinion in Markman, even where 
documents (such as contracts) are generally construed as matters of law and their constructions 
are reviewed de novo, their constructions have long been considered to turn on subsidiary 
questions of fact where terms are “obscure and indeterminate”76 or “contain technical words, or 
terms of art.”77 Indeed, contract interpretation hinges on subsidiary factual determinations 
whenever a contract is held to be ambiguous; then and only then is extrinsic evidence as to the 
intent of the parties admissible, and then and only then are findings about the interpretation of 
the contract reviewed for clear error by appellate courts.78 There are good reasons not to treat 
patents the same way—unlike contracts, patents are construed based on “what a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean,”79 not on the drafters’ intentions, 
because patents bind the general public rather than just private parties.  The point here, rather, is 
that there are other examples “mixed inquiries” on appellate review.  Indeed, even among patent 
law doctrines, several issues are considered matters of law and reviewed de novo, but 
nonetheless depend on underlying factual questions that are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard: the public use80 and on sale81 bars, and obviousness.82 
76 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting Brown & Co. v. M’Gran, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 479, 493 (1840)). 
77 Id. (quoting Goddard v. Foster, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 123, 142 (1872)). 
78 See, e.g., Thatcher v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 397 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“‘The plain meaning of 
language of a contract or consent decree is a pure question of law, subject to de novo review by the appellate court.’  
However, ‘if the intent of the parties is not unambiguously expressed by the language of the decree, the district court 
may review extrinsic evidence and enter subsidiary factual findings as to the parties’ intent, which are reviewed only 
for clear error.’”) (quoting South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1985)) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Sy-
Lene of Wash., Inc. v. Starwood Urban Retail II, LLC, 829 A.2d 540, 546 (Md. 2003) (a state-court example, 
describing this as the “objective” theory of contract interpretation). 
79 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
80 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
81 Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d 1261, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
82 Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Note that in some 
cases—where the factual determinations are made by a jury or by the International Trade Commission—the standard 
of review is not clear error. See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(standard of review for jury findings is whether “a reasonable jury could infer” them from the evidence); Comm. for 
Fairly Traded Venez. Cement v. United States, 372 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (standard of review for ITC 
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Thus, reviewing subsidiary factual issues in claim construction deferentially would be 
neither unusual nor impractical.  The most sensible approach to claim construction is to treat de 
novo review as a sort of default rule, applied in the majority of cases in which its benefits—
including the ability of the skilled public to construe patent claims simply by reading the patent83 
and uniform interpretation of those claims by courts—are attainable without great cost.  The 
Federal Circuit would then defer to factual findings only in the exceptional cases in which they 
were necessary for a district court to understand how a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
have understood the claims of a patent.  In these latter cases, the costs of de novo review—
including inaccurate determination of technical issues and wasted trial-level judicial and litigant 
resources—outweigh the benefits. 
 
III. THE DEFERENCE PRECEDENT REQUIRES AND HOW TO FIX IT
Assuming that some deference should, for policy reasons, be given to “underlying factual 
determinations”84 in at least the exceptional claim construction appeal, there remains the 
question of whether the Federal Circuit is free to grant such deference by ruling en banc in an 
appropriate case, or whether such deference is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Markman.85 Phillips Question 7 directed parties to brief the issue of whether a grant of such 
 
determinations is whether the determinations are supported by substantial evidence).  The distinctions among 
deferential standards of review are not important to the argument here. 
 Also, the fact that the proposed approach to deferential review has been used in other contexts does not 
necessarily mean that it works well or is without controversy in those other contexts.  See generally William H. 
Burgess, Comment, Simplicity at the Cost of Clarity: Appellate Review of Claim Construction and the Failed 
Promise of Cybor, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 763, 769–770 (2004) (discussing evolution and merits of the “mixed standard 
of review” for obviousness).   
83 The skilled public would have to be able to determine whether a patent can be construed on its face, or whether 
underlying factual findings are necessary.  The benefit of drawing the line where Vitronics did is that if a claim term 
is unambiguous from the intrinsic evidence, potential infringers can rely on the unambiguous construction.  If claim 
terms are ambiguous, then even with the present system of de novo review and stare decisis, patentees must wait for 
a patent to be construed in court at least once, or incur high litigation costs themselves. 
84 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting from order granting 
rehearing en banc). 
85 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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deference is compatible with Markman and with Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.86 Some 
parties briefed the question as though there was no obstacle;87 one suggested that such deference 
was compatible not only with Markman but also, possibly, with Cybor;88 and another argued that 
Cybor is recent enough that stare decisis should counsel against overruling it, but that Cybor 
precluded deferential appellate review.89 In all these cases, however, the wording of the Federal 
Circuit’s question—and the consequent briefing of the parties—assumed that Cybor would 
remain good law.  A broader question—and perhaps a better question—is whether even 
overruling Cybor is sufficient, or whether overruling or at least clarifying Markman is necessary 
at the level of the Supreme Court. 
This Part considers these issues in turn.  First, in Section A, it argues briefly that contrary 
to the statements of a few Federal Circuit judges, Cybor is incompatible with any grant of 
deference to trial court rulings.  It then argues in Section B that two different, interrelated aspects 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman compel de novo review of patent claim 
constructions on appeal: first, Markman’s admittedly ambiguous categorization of claim 
construction as a matter of law, and second, Markman’s statement that stare decisis ought to 
apply to claim interpretation. Section C argues that Markman’s stare decisis holding makes little 
sense and that the two aspects of Markman should be clarified or overruled by the Supreme 
 
86 “7. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 . . . 
(1996), and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998), is it 
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings? If so, on 
what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?”  Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1383 (order granting en banc 
review); see Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
87 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Connecticut Intellectual Property Law Association Regarding the Issue of Claim 
Construction at 10–11, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 20, 2004), available at 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/CS4555.PDF;  
88 See Brief for Amicus Curiae Sughrue Mion, PLLC at 16–19, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286 (Fed. 
Cir. Sep. 20, 2004), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/sughrue_mion_pllc.pdf.  The Sughrue 
Mion brief is a bit ambiguous as to its position; it characterizes various concurrences and dissents as having 
“expressed doubt as to the reasoning of Cybor,” but most of the statements it cites appear to be attempts to reconcile 
Cybor with some deference. 
89 See Brief for Amicus Curiae The Association of the Bar of the City of New York in Support of Neither Party at 
16–18, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 20, 2004), available at 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/new_york_city_association_of_the_bar.pdf. 
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Court.  It further argues that although the arguments for treating claim construction as a matter of 
law in the ordinary case are compelling, efforts by a judge to determine what terminology means 
within a particular art on the basis of extrinsic evidence should be granted deference, as 
explained above in Part II.   
A. WHAT CYBOR COMPELS 
Cybor held explicitly that “claim construction is purely a matter of law” and that the 
Federal Circuit “reviews the district court’s claim construction de novo on appeal.”90 It held 
further that “[n]othing in the Supreme Court’s [Markman] opinion supports the view that the 
Court endorsed [the position] that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying 
questions of fact. . . . [W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim 
construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim 
construction.”91 
Nonetheless, some Federal Circuit concurrences have suggested that Cybor does permit 
some implicit deference, even if not overtly recognized as such.92 Judge Bryson emphasized in 
his Cybor concurrence that “the rule that claim construction is an issue of law does not mean that 
[the Federal Circuit] intend[s] to disregard the work done by district courts in claim construction 
or that [it] will give no weight to a district court’s conclusion as to claim construction.”93 Judge 
Bryson went on to cite several examples of situations in which appellate courts, while ruling de 
novo on lower-court decisions of law, nonetheless granted some implicit deference: the Supreme 
Court deferring to regional circuits on issues of state law in states within the circuit; the Federal 
Circuit deferring to the Board of Contract Appeals on issues of contract interpretation, their area 
 
90 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citing Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
91 Id. at 1455–56. 
92 See generally Brief for Amicus Curiae Sughrue Mion, PLLC at 17–18, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Nos. 03-1269, 03-
1286 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 20, 2004), available at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/sughrue_mion_pllc.pdf. 
93 138 F.3d at 1463 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
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of particular expertise; and the Supreme Court leaving patent questions to the Federal Circuit.94 
Judge Plager articulated a similar belief, arguing that even under a de novo standard of review, 
the trial judge’s rulings will “carry weight.”95 And in Phillips, Judge Lourie noted that “even 
though claim construction is a matter of law, reviewable . . . without formal deference, I do 
believe that we ought to lean towards affirmance of a claim construction in the absence of a 
strong conviction of error.”96 
Despite these generalized statements, however, the Federal Circuit has not generally 
granted any deference to subsidiary findings, implicitly or explicitly.  Notably, all of these 
observations about the possibility that some deference can be applied even under Cybor have 
come in concurrence or dissent; the Federal Circuit has never recognized the possibility of 
deference under Cybor in a panel opinion.  The high reversal rate in patent cases also strongly 
suggests that the Federal Circuit does not, in practice, “lean towards affirmance.”97 
Regardless, even if it were to be adopted by the court, such a vague approach is an 
incomplete solution.  As discussed above in Part II, what is needed is not an increased hesitation 
to reverse district courts—or at least, not just that—but rather a framework that permits the 
benefits of fully independent de novo review in the common case, but the benefits of deferential 
review when the technical aspects of a patent trump its legal aspects.  Yet Cybor permits nothing 
of the sort; it explicitly dismissed a suggestion that “allegedly fact-based questions” be treated 
any differently from the rest of the claim construction analysis.98 Thus, for the Federal Circuit to 
 
94 Id.; cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991) (holding that although review of district-court 
state law determinations by courts of appeals is de novo, that de novo review “necessarily entails a careful 
consideration of the district court's legal analysis, and an efficient and sensitive appellate court at least will naturally 
consider this analysis in underaking its review. . . . Any expertise possessed by the district court will inform the 
structure and content of its conclusions of law and thereby become evident to the reviewing court”). 
95 138 F.3d at 1462 (Plager, J., concurring). 
96 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Lourie, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
97 See supra note 73. 
98 138 F.3d at 1455–56. 
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grant district courts the greater deference that Part II advocated, Cybor must be overruled.99 It 
resolved the question of deference in terms too explicit to ignore. 
Two concluding notes on Cybor bear mention.  First, as the New York City Bar 
Association brief in Phillips suggested,100 there are prudential reasons why overruling Cybor at 
the Federal Circuit is less than desirable.  Cybor may have been incorrect, at least in its extreme 
rejection of any possibility of formalized deference, but circumstances have not changed in the 
few years since it was decided that would ordinarily warrant a departure from the principle of 
stare decisis.101 On the other hand, and second, Cybor’s holding that claim construction is to be 
reviewed de novo is arguably dictum.  A deferential standard of review was not necessary to its 
outcome: Judges Mayer and Newman voted in favor of Cybor’s ultimate judgment of affirmance 
despite disagreeing with the majority that de novo review should apply.102 As such, the case may 
have been a poor vehicle for deciding the core question of the appropriate standard of review the 
Federal Circuit, but this makes overruling it correspondingly easier, if overruling is formally 
necessary at all.  Either way, however, as Section B will argue, Markman likely needs overruling 
or clarification by the Supreme Court, and because Cybor’s holding has never been decided at 
that level, the prudential concerns do not apply to a Supreme Court decision that compels Cybor 
to be modified. 
 
99 Like all decisions of the Federal Circuit, Cybor may be overruled by the Federal Circuit sitting en banc.  See 
George E. Warren Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Panel Discussion on 
Intra-Circuit Conflicts, 11 FED. CIR. BAR J. 623, 648 (quoting Judge Michel as saying “the later en banc always 
trumps the earlier en banc”). 
100 See Brief for Amicus Curiae The Association of the Bar of the City of New York in Support of Neither Party at 
16–17, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 20, 2004), available at 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/files/new_york_city_association_of_the_bar.pdf. 
101 See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(en banc) (stating that judicial departure from stare decisis requires “special justification,” but finding that 
justification where “the ‘conceptual underpinnings’ of . . . precedent . . . have significantly diminished in force,” as 
the court held that they had with respect to the law of adverse inferences from failure to produce exculpatory opinion 
letters). 
102 See 138 F.3d at 1463–64 (Mayer, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
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B. WHAT MARKMAN COMPELS 
Markman is the only case in which the Supreme Court has recently confronted the 
categorization of claim construction as a matter of law or fact, and thus the only relevant source 
of binding authority in the en banc Federal Circuit on the question of deference.  Importantly, 
however, Markman avoided all discussion of deference, and, indeed, at times appeared to eschew 
a clear Cybor-like holding that claim construction is a matter of pure law.103 At issue in 
Markman was whether the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial in civil 
cases104 mandates that juries determine patent claim interpretations, or whether claim 
interpretation can and should be left for the judge.105 But in determining that it could and should 
be a matter for the judge, the Court outlined a series of policy arguments regarding institutional 
competence and the stare decisis effect of claims that leave no room for appellate deference to 
trial court claim construction rulings. 
1. Claim Construction as a Matter of Law 
In attempting to justify deference, both Federal Circuit judges106 and commentators107 
have cited Justice Souter’s statements in Markman that claim interpretation is a “mongrel 
practice” that “falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.”108 
However, as the Federal Circuit majority in Cybor pointed out, even though the Supreme Court 
in Markman acknowledged that claim interpretation may have factual elements in reality, it 
 
103 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996) (“We have also spoken of the line as 
one between issues of fact and law. . . . But the sounder course . . . is to classify a mongrel practice (like construing a 
term of art following receipt of evidence) by using the historical method.”).  Justice Souter, the author of Markman,
appears to have gone to some lengths to restrict the Court’s statement to the question of whether claim construction 
is an issue for the judge or for the jury and to avoid making clear statements categorizing claim construction as a 
matter of law.  See, e.g., id. at 372 (“The question here is whether the interpretation of a so-called patent claim . . . is 
a matter of law reserved entirely for the court . . . .  We hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of art 
within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”). 
104 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,  and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in 
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”). 
105 Markman, 517 U.S. at 372. 
106 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1473 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
107 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 43, at 1047–48 (citing Markman’s “mongrel practice” language). 
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consciously dismissed them when determining how claim interpretation should be treated under 
the law.109 Justice Souter’s analysis was “functional” in character and assigned claim 
construction as a legal question for judges for policy reasons, 110 but it did assign them to the 
category of “law” rather than “fact”: 
“[T]he fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter 
of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than 
another to decide the issue in question.”  So it turns out here, for judges, not juries, 
are the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms. 
 The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges 
often do and are likely to do better than jurors . . . .111 
The Supreme Court went on to state that “any credibility determinations”—the archetypal factual 
determination112—“will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole 
document.”113 Justice Souter might have intended to allocate claim construction to judges while 
retaining it as a question of fact entitled to clear error review; after all, judges can engage in 
factfinding without juries.114 However, the language of the opinion does not support this view.  
Rather, claim construction was given to judges as an interpretive issue uniquely within their 
competence as legal experts “train[ed] in exegesis,”115 and the Court proceeded to give reasons 
why it “treat[ed] interpretive issues as purely legal.”116 Under Supreme Court precedent, legal 
issues, when defined as such, are reviewed by appellate courts de novo.117 
108 Markman, 517 U.S. at 378, 388. 
109 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455 (“[T]he Supreme Court was addressing which category, fact or law, claim construction 
should fall and not whether it should be classified as having two components, fact and law.”). 
110 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388. 
111 Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). 
112 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985) (holding that all factual 
determinations, not just credibility determinations, are reviewed for clear error, but noting the long history of 
restricting clear error review to credibility determinations and maintaining especial deference where credibility is 
concerned). 
113 Markman, 517 U.S. at 389. 
114 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (“In applying the clearly erroneous 
standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that 
their function is not to decide factual issues de novo.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
115 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388. 
116 Id. at 391. 
117 Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (“Independent appellate review of legal issues best 
serves the dual goals of doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial administration.”). 
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2. Estoppel Versus Stare Decisis 
Another aspect of Markman bolsters this conclusion that Markman necessarily implies de 
novo review: its holding that claim interpretations have stare decisis effect.118 The Markman 
Court highlighted the importance of uniformity in claim construction, observing that for the 
patentee, for other possible inventors, and for potential infringers alike, “the limits of a patent 
must be known.”119 To this end, it argued that treating claim construction as purely legal would 
enable an adjudicated claim construction to be considered as legal precedent.120 The Court 
specifically distinguished issue preclusion, in which the determination of issues—including 
claim constructions—adjudicated in a previous lawsuit would be considered binding upon parties 
to that suit;121 in contrast, stare decisis could be asserted by any party.122 
Although the exact contours of Markman stare decisis are unclear, it would appear that 
the Court intended patent claim constructions by the Federal Circuit to be binding on district 
courts, even in other lawsuits.123 It would be peculiar indeed for a determination made by a 
district court, then affirmed by the Federal Circuit under a deferential standard of review, to be 
 
118 Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.  Strictly speaking, Justice Souter’s opinion discussed “application of stare decisis on 
those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals court,” id.;
this might imply that by the term “stare decisis,” he meant the persuasive effect of one district court’s claim 
construction on another rather than the binding effect of Federal Circuit claim constructions on other courts.  
Whatever Justice Souter meant by “stare decisis,” however, it is clear that he intended claim constructions ratified 
by the Federal Circuit to have a binding effect nationwide.  See Key Pharms. v. Hercon Lab. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 
716 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“We recognize the national stare decisis effect that this court's decisions on claim construction 
have.” (citing Markman)). 
119 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. 
120 See id. at 391; see also Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., No. 01 C 1867, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22218, at 
*5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2004) (“The Supreme Court has stressed the need for this ‘intrajurisdictional certainty’ by 
making claim construction a legal issue that in turn imposes the application of stare decisis on patent interpretation, 
making the Federal Circuit's claim construction of the ’176 patent legal precedent in this case.”). 
121 See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 331–33, 349–50 (1971). 
122 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
123 See Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“[S]tare decisis is a doctrine that binds courts to follow their own earlier decisions or the decisions of a superior 
tribunal.”).  At least some district courts appear to conclude from this principle that Federal Circuit claim 
constructions are binding.  See Wang Lab. v. Oki Elec. Indus. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 166, 175 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(holding, in light of Markman and the general principle that Federal Circuit law is binding on district courts as to 
patent law, that the Federal Circuit’s construction of two patents was binding on the trial court in a later suit 
concerning those patents); see also Tex. Insts. v. Linear Techs. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 2d 580, 589 (E.D. Tex. 2002) 
(holding that the court was not bound by the claim interpretation of a sister district court, but implying that this 
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given the effect of binding circuit precedent.  Indeed, a deferential standard of review would 
undermine any claim that a claim construction was binding on future cases. 
To see why this is so, consider what it means for a ruling to be held “not clearly 
erroneous.”  Formally, when a judgment is affirmed as “not clearly erroneous,” that does not 
imply that the affirming court agrees with every aspect of the judgment or would have come to 
the same conclusion as the district court.124 Rather, it implies only that the judgment of the 
district court is not so far wrong—literally, not so clearly erroneous—that it cannot be allowed to 
stand.125 Another trial court might confront exactly the same patent claims, but come to a 
different conclusion about their construction, either because it has heard different evidence about 
a dispositive underlying factual issue or because it has made different credibility determinations 
about the expert testimony on that issue.  Two rulings can simultaneously be “not clearly 
erroneous” even if they conflict with each other, and the fact that a particular claim construction 
has been upheld does not mean that another judge is bound to arrive at the same one if the 
standard of review for the first ruling was deferential. 
Furthermore, in order for stare decisis to comport with due process, it must be restricted 
to questions of law that do not depend on the particular evidence presented.  Due process 
requires that parties to a lawsuit have an opportunity to have their claims heard;126 when stare 
decisis applies a binding judicial decision to parties who did not originally litigate that decision, 
these due process protections would seem to be violated,127 as they would be if claim or issue 
 
reasoning only applied because the two were coordinate courts and one was not ordinarily bound by decisions of the 
other). 
124 See In re McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1402 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (observing this logical conclusion and 
stating that holdings that are based on clear-error deference to a district court are “not really holdings by an appellate 
panel . . . . Instead, they are holdings that the district judges’ [decision] is not clear error”). 
125 See id. 
126 E.g., Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996). 
127 See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003); see also N.W. Forest 
Resource Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that use of stare decisis to treat a district 
court decision in another district as binding violates due process). 
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preclusion were applied against a nonparty to the original action.128 The way out of this dilemma 
is twofold.  First, stare decisis is typically seen as binding courts rather than parties; parties 
remain free to challenge binding precedent in a higher court.129 But this rationale is only 
effective as to matters that the higher court is free to examine independently.  If the ruling with 
stare decisis effect were based on clearly erroneous review of an evidentiary finding, a party 
challenging that ruling through a later appellate proceeding would lack the opportunity to be 
heard that the original parties had, and the reviewing court, like the appellate court that issued the 
first affirmance, would be constrained in its capacity for review.  Second, and relatedly, stare 
decisis is seen as acceptable because judicial rulings on questions of law are within the discretion 
of the court to pronounce, they are a form of positive lawmaking, and they are—in principle, at 
least—based on legal principles that will not change in light of new evidence.130 This rationale, 
too, depends on the binding decision being a matter of pure law. 
Thus, if the Supreme Court in Markman is serious in its holding that claim constructions 
are entitled to stare decisis effect—and it appears to be so—then that holding implies that claim 
construction is indeed a matter of pure law, reviewable de novo by appellate courts.  It follows 
also that if, as Part II of this paper argued above, subsidiary findings of fact are an important part 
of some claim construction rulings and should be reviewed deferentially, Markman must be 
clarified or overruled.  The next section will argue that the Supreme Court can build upon 
Markman without overruling it entirely, so as to maintain its goal of uniformity while permitting 
deference in appropriate cases. 
C. HOW TO FIX MARKMAN 
Markman’s holding that stare decisis applies to claim construction and its statement that 
claim construction is a matter of law appear to stand in the way of a sensible approach to claim 
 
128 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 331–33, 349–50. 
129 Nat’l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2001).   
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construction as a “mixed” inquiry that rightly treats patents as both the legal and the technical 
documents that they are.  There are several reasons why there is nevertheless no need for a 
dramatic change in or outright overruling of Markman, however; rather, the Supreme Court can 
(and should, in an appropriate case) clarify its position on claim construction by embracing clear 
error review of subsidiary facts while leaving most of Markman—with its well-placed policy 
concerns for uniformity and stability in patent claim interpretation—intact.131 
First, Markman was primarily about the question of whether judges or juries should 
construe patent claims.132 Nothing in this article’s proposal for clear error review of underlying 
facts affects the Court’s holdings about the respective roles of judges and juries or the Seventh 
Amendment.  Although the application of the Seventh Amendment is related to a distinction 
between “fact” and “law,” Justice Souter explicitly noted in Markman that claim construction is 
a “mongrel” between the two and thus that the “sounder course” is to classify it for Seventh 
Amendment purposes by reference to historical practices.133 The holding that historical practices 
preclude any Seventh Amendment right to the jury determination of claim constructions is not 
inconsistent with a holding that claim constructions deserve some level of appellate deference.  
The fact/law distinction that Justice Souter held unhelpful in deciding the Seventh Amendment 
question may retain its vitality in determining a standard of review.  Factual and legal 
determinations in patent claim construction may be too finely distinguished, as a practical matter, 
 
130 See Barrett, supra note 127, at 1047–60. 
131 Indeed, as Judge Rader observed in dissent in Cybor, purely de novo review of patent claim construction rulings 
has the potential to decrease, rather than increase, the stability of the patent system—the reversal rate is so high that 
litigants can no longer rely on the early determination of patent claims promised by the first Markman opinion and 
must instead wait for the Federal Circuit to rule.  Worse—argued Rader, using the example of CVI/Beta Ventures, 
Inc. v. Tura LP, see infra note 139—even the Federal Circuit’s rulings have lacked stability from appeal to appeal.  
See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476–77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J., dissenting from the 
pronouncements on claim interpretation in the en banc opinion, concurring in the judgment, and joining part IV of 
the en banc opinion). 
132 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 
F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“The Court's primary concern in [Markman] was the Seventh 
Amendment issue of whether a right to a jury trial on claim construction inured to a party due to any potential 
factual issues involved.”). 
133 517 U.S. at 378. 
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to separate out the former for jury determination, but they are not necessarily too finely 
distinguished for an appellate court to be resistant to overturning the factual findings that a trial 
judge has made on the way to understanding what a skilled artisan, as opposed to a lay person, 
learns from a patent.134 Moreover, the Seventh Amendment question and the deference question 
are logically distinct; trial judges often serve as factfinders and are still granted deference, and a 
trial judge serving in this capacity is still able to make credibility determinations.135 Thus, it is 
only the stare decisis holding (and the Court’s closely-related and absolute-sounding, but not 
strictly necessary, statements about claim construction being treated as a matter of law) that are 
in tension with heightened deference. 
Second, however, even this stare decisis holding need not change in most cases.  As 
discussed above,136 cases in which extrinsic evidence—and thus appellate deference to trial court 
factfinding—are necessary are rare.  In most cases, claim construction will be a purely legal 
issue and can still be granted stare decisis effect.  In the remainder of cases, much of the claim 
construction process is legal in character and can still bind future courts, even if any factual 
determinations require reexamination in light of a party’s proffers of evidence.  At first, it might 
seem peculiar to grant stare decisis effect only to some claim constructions or to some portions 
of a claim construction opinion, but courts often make fine-grained determinations about the 
extent to which other courts’ rulings are controlling, in the contexts of both estoppels and of the 
distinction between holdings and dicta.  There is no reason to believe that such a system is 
unworkable, and it would preserve a large portion of the uniformity and stability that Markman 
extols. 
 
134 On the other hand, courts often give subsidiary questions of fact to juries but reserve the overarching questions of 
law for judges.  For instance, when construing contracts, underlying factual determinations are often given to juries, 
even if the interpretation of the document is ultimately a question of law for the court.  See Markman v. Westview 
Insts., 52 F.3d 967, 997 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Mayer, J., concurring), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
135 Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (allocating to the trial judge the gatekeeping 
function of determining whether expert testimony is reliable). 
31
Finally, it is questionable whether stare decisis has had the pro-uniformity effects that the 
Supreme Court hoped for.  Of federal court decisions that cite Markman, only about a dozen 
discuss the stare decisis effect of claim constructions,137 and only a few of these appear to grant 
stare decisis effect to patent claim constructions; the doctrine is apparently seldom used in 
practice.  Indeed, even the Federal Circuit has declined to apply it.  For example, in CVI/Beta 
Ventures, Inc. v. Custom Optical Frames, Inc.,138 the court construed the claim term “elasticity” 
one way, solely on the basis of intrinsic evidence.  Yet in a subsequent case involving the same 
patentee, the court declined to use the same construction of the same claim term, and indeed 
reversed a district court opinion that had done so.139 If the Federal Circuit is not going to give 
stare decisis effect to its own claim interpretations, this guts the doctrine entirely: district courts 
have held that the stare decisis effect does not apply to the decisions of one district court as to 
another,140 so the only rulings that ordinarily have binding stare decisis effect are those of an 
appellate court.141 
One reason why stare decisis is so seldom used may be that it is unnecessary.  Nonmutual 
 
136 See supra Section B. 
137 Lexis search of “All Federal Cases,” “Markman /p patent /p claim /p ‘stare decisis’,” March 22, 2005. 
138 92 F.3d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
139 CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Moore, supra note 35, at 18–21.  As 
Moore notes, the Federal Circuit later attempted to resolve the inconsistency between the two CVI/Beta cases on the 
grounds that the former was in the context of a preliminary injunction proceeding.  See CVI/Beta Ventures, 112 F.3d 
at 1160 n.7; Moore, supra note 35, at 19–20.  It is true that the claim construction in the preliminary injunction 
proceeding was, due to the early stage of the litigation, non-final.  CVI/Beta, 112 F.3d at 1160 n.7.  However, Moore 
argues, correctly in my view, that this explanation is not compelling if claim construction is a matter of pure law and 
where, as in the CVI/Beta cases, decisions are made solely on the same intrinsic evidence.  See Moore, supra note 
35, at 20. 
140 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Dolan, No. 3:01-CV-1537-K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19578, at *5–*6 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 3, 
2003). 
141 Intriguingly, the Federal Circuit has occasionally applied stare decisis—or at least cited to previous claim 
construction rulings—when construing individual claim terms, even when those terms are used in the cited and 
citing opinions in two entirely different patents and contexts.  See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Hillerich & 
Bradsby Co., No. 05-1103, slip op. at 9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2006) (citing Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 
F.3d 1363, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004), an opinion construing the term “annular” in a transistor patent, while 
construing the term “annular” in a baseball bat patent).  Wilson Sporting Goods is even a post-Phillips opinion, in 
which one might expect the court to construe claim terms only in context—though admittedly the court’s citation 
was as to the “ordinary and customary” meaning of the term.  See id. 
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collateral estoppel may always be employed against a patentee on issues of claim construction,142 
and judicial estoppel may bind a patentee to the patentee’s previous proposed constructions even 
where that patentee did not originally prevail.143 Estoppel doctrines are clearer, fairer, and 
stronger, and they apply equally to fact and to law; as such, it is likely that courts use them in 
preference to stare decisis in the majority of patent cases where they are available, and that in 
practice they do much of the work that the Supreme Court assigned to stare decisis. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Given these considerations, the Supreme Court should consider moderating its holding in 
Markman and overruling the overly strict holding by the Federal Circuit in Cybor that every 
aspect of claim construction is a matter of law for the court.  Markman’s stare decisis effect 
needs modification, or at least clarification, if such a moderation is to occur, but it would be no 
great loss even if the stare decisis holding were to disappear entirely—and it need not.   
All that is necessary is for the Supreme Court to take an appropriate case involving expert 
testimony.  It is entirely appropriate that Phillips was not that case; despite the appearance of 
Question 7 in the Federal Circuit’s en banc order,144 the trial court in Phillips heard no expert 
testimony, and neither the majority nor the dissent in the Phillips panel opinion resorted to 
extrinsic evidence to conduct their claim constructions.145 When an appropriate case arises, 
though, the Supreme Court can and should close the rift that Markman and Cybor created within 
the patent community, and in so doing should strike a sensible balance between the conceptions 
of  a patent as a legal document and as a technical one. 
 
142 Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 331–33, 349–50 (1971). 
143 See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001). 
144 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing en banc). 
145 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, passim (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
